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Abstract
A deep neural network (DNN) classifier represents a model owner’s intellectual property
as training a DNN classifier often requires lots of resource. Watermarking was recently
proposed to protect the intellectual property of DNN classifiers. However, watermarking
suffers from a key limitation: it sacrifices the utility/accuracy of the model owner’s classifier
because it tampers the classifier’s training or fine-tuning process. In this work, we propose
IPGuard, the first method to protect intellectual property of DNN classifiers that provably
incurs no accuracy loss for the classifiers. Our key observation is that a DNN classifier
can be uniquely represented by its classification boundary. Based on this observation,
IPGuard extracts some data points near the classification boundary of the model owner’s
classifier and uses them to fingerprint the classifier. A DNN classifier is said to be a pirated
version of the model owner’s classifier if they predict the same labels for most fingerprinting
data points. IPGuard is qualitatively different from watermarking. Specifically, IPGuard
extracts fingerprinting data points near the classification boundary of a classifier that is
already trained, while watermarking embeds watermarks into a classifier during its training
or fine-tuning process. We extensively evaluate IPGuard on CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and
ImageNet datasets. Our results show that IPGuard can robustly identify post-processed
versions of the model owner’s classifier as pirated versions of the classifier, and IPGuard
can identify classifiers, which are not the model owner’s classifier nor its post-processed
versions, as non-pirated versions of the classifier.
1 Introduction
Suppose a model owner trains a DNN classifier and deploys it as a cloud service or a client-
side software (e.g., mobile app, Amazon Echo). An attacker could steal or pirate the model
parameters of the classifier via malware infection, insider threats, or recent model extraction
attacks [33, 34, 18, 26, 16, 36, 15]. The attacker then deploys the pirated classifier as its own
cloud service or client-side software. Such attacks violate the intellectual property of the model
owner as training a DNN classifier often requires lots of resource, e.g., proprietary training data,
confidential algorithm, and computational infrastructure. Therefore, it is an urgent problem
to protect the intellectual property of DNN classifiers.
Watermarking is a standard general technique to protect intellectual property and has
been widely studied for multimedia data [11]. Therefore, a natural solution seems to ap-
ply watermarking to protect intellectual property of DNN classifiers. Indeed, multiple stud-
ies [25, 4, 1, 24, 7, 38, 9] have recently extended watermarking techniques to DNN classifiers.
Specifically, watermarking embeds a watermark into the model owner’s classifier via modifying
its training or fine-tuning process. A classifier (e.g., the classifier pirated and deployed by an
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Figure 1: IPGuard leverages some data points near the target classifier’s classification boundary
and their labels predicted by the target classifier to fingerprint the target classifier.
attacker) is verified to be a pirated version of the model owner’s classifier if the same or similar
watermark can be extracted from the classifier. For convenience, we call the model owner’s
classifier and the classifier to be verified target classifier and suspect classifier, respectively. If
a suspect classifier is verified to be potentially pirated from the target classifier, then the model
owner can take further follow-up actions, e.g., collecting other evidence and filing a lawsuit.
A key limitation of watermarking is that it sacrifices the utility/accuracy of the target
classifier because it tampers the training or fine-tuning process of the target classifier. In critical
application domains such as healthcare and finance, even 1% accuracy loss is intolerable.
In this work, we propose IPGuard, the first method to protect the intellectual property
of DNN classifiers that provably incurs no accuracy loss of the target classifier. Our key
observation is that a DNN classifier can be uniquely represented by its classification boundary,
which essentially divides the data domain into regions, each of which is predicted to have
the same label by the classifier. Based on the observation, IPGuard finds some data points
near the target classifier’s classification boundary (see Figure 1). Moreover, IPGuard treats
these data points (we call them fingerprinting data points) and their labels predicted by the
target classifier as a fingerprint for the target classifier. For a suspect classifier, the model
owner queries its prediction API to get the labels of the fingerprinting data points. If the
suspect classifier and the target classifier predict the same labels for most fingerprinting data
points, then the model owner verifies that the suspect classifier is potentially pirated from the
target classifier. Unlike watermarking, IPGuard provably incurs no accuracy loss for the target
classifier, because IPGuard does not tamper its training or fine-tuning process at all.
We aim to achieve three critical goals, i.e., robustness, uniqueness, and efficiency. An
attacker may post-process the target classifier before deploying it, e.g., the attacker may reduce
the size of the target classifier via model compression techniques before deploying it on resource-
constrained devices such as mobile phone and IoT device. Therefore, our method should be
robust against post-processing, i.e., our method should still verify a suspect classifier if it is a
post-processed version of the target classifier. Uniqueness means that if a suspect classifier is
not the target classifier nor its post-processed version, then our method should not verify it as
a pirated version of the target classifier. Efficiency means that our method should efficiently
find the fingerprinting data points for large-scale DNN classifiers.
To achieve robustness and uniqueness, we aim to find fingerprinting data points near the
target classifier’s classification boundary. We do not use fingerprinting data points on the
classification boundary because their predicted labels are not robust against post-processing,
and we do not use fingerprinting data points that are far away from the classification boundary
because their predicted labels are not unique to the target classifier and its post-processed
versions. One way to find such fingerprinting data points seems to use adversarial examples
methods, i.e., treating adversarial examples as fingerprinting data points. However, existing
adversarial example methods (e.g., [32, 8, 21, 3]) are insufficient because they either find
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adversarial examples that are far away from the classification boundary or are inefficient. For
instance, FGSM [8] can efficiently find adversarial examples but they are far away from the
classification boundary. CW [3] can find adversarial examples near the classification boundary
but it is inefficient. The key reason is that CW aims to find human imperceptible adversarial
examples. In particular, given an initial example/data point, CW aims to search for a minimum
noise to turn the example into an adversarial example. Searching for such minimum noise is
inefficient.
Therefore, we propose a new method to efficiently find data points near the target classifier’s
classification boundary. We formulate finding such a data point as an optimization problem.
Moreover, we use gradient descent to solve the problem, i.e., we start from an initial data point
and iteratively move the data point along the gradient of the objective function. Our method
is efficient because, unlike CW, we do not constrain the noise added to the initial data point.
We evaluate IPGuard and compare it with multiple existing adversarial example methods
on CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and ImageNet datasets. We consider six popular post-processing
techniques including 2 variants of fine-tuning, 2 variants of retraining, and 2 variants of model
compression, which an attacker may apply to a target classifier to obtain pirated classifiers. On
each dataset, we also consider dozens of classifiers, which are not post-processed versions of a
target classifier, as suspect classifiers. We propose a new metric to jointly measure robustness-
uniqueness tradeoffs. Our results show that IPGuard can verify the post-processed versions
of a target classifier as pirated versions of the classifier, and IPGuard does not falsely verify
the suspect classifiers, which are not the target classifier nor its post-processed versions, as
pirated versions of the target classifier. In other words, IPGuard can achieve robustness and
uniqueness simultaneously. Our results essentially indicate that we can find data points near
a target classifier’s classification boundary such that the predicted labels of these data points
are robust against post-processing of the target classifier but are different for other classifiers.
Moreover, IPGuard outperforms existing adversarial example methods. For instance, IPGuard
and CW [3] can achieve comparable robustness-uniqueness tradeoffs, but IPGuard is orders of
magnitude more efficient than CW.
To summarize, our contributions are as follows:
• We propose IPGuard, the first method to protect intellectual property of DNN classifiers
that provably incurs no loss on the classifiers’ accuracies.
• We propose a new method to efficiently find data points near a classifier’s classification
boundary.
• We propose a new metric to measure the robustness-uniqueness tradeoffs of a finger-
printing method. Moreover, we empirically compare IPGuard with existing adversarial
example methods on three datasets.
2 Related Work
2.1 Watermarking
An attacker could steal or pirate a DNN classifier through various methods. For instance, an
insider can steal and sell the DNN classifier to a competitor. An attacker could also compromise
the model owner’s machine that stores the DNN classifier via social engineering attacks and
malware if the machine has system and software vulnerabilities, and then steal the DNN
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classifier. Moreover, an attacker could also leverage recent attacks [33, 34, 18, 26, 16, 36, 15]
(e.g., hardware-based side-channel attacks [16, 36, 15]) that exploit the unique characteristics
of DNN classifiers.
Watermarking [25, 4, 1, 24, 7, 38, 9] was recently proposed to protect the intellectual
property of DNN classifiers. Specifically, watermarking embeds a watermark into a target
classifier during the process of training or fine-tuning the target classifier. A suspect classifier
is verified to be a pirated version of the target classifier if the same or similar watermark can
be extracted from it.
Depending on how the watermark is embedded into a DNN classifier, we can roughly group
watermarking techniques into two categories, i.e., parameter-based watermarking and label-
based watermarking. In parameter-based watermarking [25, 4], the watermark is embedded
into the model parameters of the target DNN classifier via adding new regularization terms to
the loss function during training. Parameter-based watermarking requires white-box access to
the model parameters of the suspect classifier in order to verify the watermark. In label-based
watermarking [1, 24, 7, 38, 9], the watermark is embedded into the predicted labels or neuron
activations of certain data points. Specifically, they first pick some data points (e.g., abstract
images [1], training data points with extra meaningful content [38]) and assign certain labels
to them. Then, they use these data points to augment the training data to learn the target
classifier. Given a suspect classifier, they query the suspect classifier to obtain labels of the
data points. If the labels predicted by the suspect classifier match those predicted by the target
classifier, then the watermark is verified.
Limitation: Watermarking techniques suffer from a key limitation: they inevitably sacrifice
utility/accuracy of the target classifier because they require tampering the target classifier’s
training or fine-tuning process. It is a well known challenge to search for a good DNN archi-
tecture that has a high accuracy for a particular task. For instance, on the ImageNet dataset,
it took lots of trial-and-error efforts for the computer vision community to search for the DNN
architecture called ResNet152V2 [13], which increases the testing accuracy upon the DNN ar-
chitecture called ResNet152 [12] by 1% [5]. However, watermarking [7] easily decreases the
testing accuracy by 0.5% when embedding only 20 watermark data points into an ImageNet
model.
2.2 Adversarial Examples
Suppose we are given an example/data point and a classifier, where the classifier can correctly
predict the label of the example. We can add some carefully crafted noise to the example such
that the classifier predicts a label as we desire. The example with carefully crafted noise is
called an adversarial example [32]. In particular, we may desire the classifier to predict any
incorrect label for the adversarial example (called untargeted adversarial example) or predict
a particular incorrect label for the adversarial example (called targeted adversarial example).
Many methods (e.g., [8, 21, 3]) have been developed to construct adversarial examples.
An adversarial example essentially moves an example across the classifier’s classification
boundary via adding carefully crafted noise to the example. Therefore, it seems a natural
choice to use adversarial examples as fingerprinting data points to fingerprint a classifier’s
classification boundary. Therefore, we review several popular methods [8, 21, 3] to construct
adversarial examples. We focus on targeted adversarial examples as we aim to construct
adversarial examples for each class to better characterize the classifier’s classification boundary.
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Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM): FGSM [8] is an efficient method to construct
adversarial examples. Given an initial example/data point x and a noise bound , FGSM
returns the following x′ as an adversarial example:
x′ = clip(x−  · sign(∇xJ(C, y∗;x))), (1)
where C is the classifier, J is the loss function used to train C, y∗ is the target label we desire
for the adversarial example, ∇x represents gradient, and clip is the function to project the
adversarial example back to the feasible data domain, e.g., each pixel is projected back to be
in the range [0, 1] if the example is an image.
Iterative Gradient Sign Method (IGSM): IGSM [21] is an improved version of FGSM.
Instead of taking just one single step, IGSM moves the example iteratively, one small step at
a time. In the tth iteration, IGSM updates the example with the following rule:
x′t = clip(x
′
t−1 − clip(α · sign(∇xJ(C, y∗;x)))), (2)
where α is a small step size and clip(z) is the function to project each dimension of z to be
at most . The process is repeated until a successful adversarial example is generated or the
maximum number of iterations is reached.
Carlini and Wagner’s methods (CW): CW methods [3] have three variants depending
on which metrics are used to measure the noise added to adversarial examples. Specifically,
CW-L0, CW-L2, and CW-L∞ use L0-norm, L2-norm, and L∞-norm to measure the magnitude
of the noise, respectively. We consider the CW-L2 method as it is much more efficient than
CW-L0 and CW-L∞. In particular, given an initial example, CW-L2 iteratively searches for a
small noise that turns the example into an adversarial example.
Limitations: Existing adversarial example methods either achieve suboptimal robustness-
uniqueness tradeoffs (we will show experimental results) or are inefficient. Specifically, FGSM
and IGSM achieve suboptimal robustness-uniqueness tradeoffs. A key reason is that the pre-
dicted labels of their constructed adversarial examples are either not robust against post-
processing of the target classifier or not unique to the target classifier. CW-L2 achieves com-
parable robustness-uniqueness tradeoffs with our IPGuard. However, CW-L2 is inefficient
because it aims to find adversarial examples with small noise. For instance, CW-L2 takes
around 20 mins to find one adversarial example on an ImageNet classifier, while our method
only takes around 76 seconds to find one data point near the classification boundary for the
same classifier.
3 Problem Definition
3.1 Threat Model
We consider two parties, i.e., model owner and attacker. A model owner trains a DNN classifier
(called target classifier) using a (proprietary) training dataset and algorithm. The model owner
could deploy the target classifier as a cloud service (also known as machine learning as a service)
or as a client-side software (e.g., Amazon Echo). An attacker pirates the target classifier and
deploys it as its own software or service. Moreover, the attacker may post-process the target
classifier before deploying it. For example, to deploy the classifier on resource-constrained
devices such as smartphone and IoT device, the attacker may use model compression methods
(e.g., pruning) [10, 23] to reduce the size of the classifier.
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The model owner derives a fingerprint for its target classifier. For a suspect classifier, the
model owner verifies whether it has the same fingerprint via leveraging its prediction API. If
the suspect classifier has the same fingerprint, then the suspect classifier is likely pirated from
the model owner’s target classifier and the model owner can take further follow-up actions,
e.g., collecting other evidence and filing a lawsuit.
3.2 Fingerprinting a DNN Classifier
We define fingerprinting a DNN classifier as designing two functions, i.e., Extract and Verify.
We describe the two functions as follows:
Extract: Given a target classifier Ct, the model owner executes the Extract function to derive
a fingerprint as fCt = Extract(Ct), where fCt is the fingerprint.
Verify: Given a suspect classifier Cs, V erify(fCt , Cs) produces either 1 or 0, where 1 means
that the suspect classifier is predicted to be a pirated version of the target classifier. We
consider that the Verify function only leverages the suspect classifier’s prediction API, which
is generally applicable no matter whether the suspect classifier is deployed as a client-side
software or a cloud service. Moreover, we assume the prediction API returns a predicted label
for a query. We note that some prediction APIs also return a confidence score vector for
a query, where the confidence score vector is a probability distribution of the query’s label.
However, we only use the predicted label in this work and leave leveraging the confidence score
vector to fingerprint a classifier as future work.
Difference with watermarking: Fingerprinting a DNN classifier is qualitatively different
from watermarking a DNN classifier. Specifically, watermarking is to embed a watermark
into a classifier during the process of training or fine-tuning the classifier, while fingerprinting
is to extract a fingerprint from a classifier that is already trained. Therefore, watermarking
inevitably sacrifices the classifier’s accuracy as it tampers the training or fine-tuning process.
For the same reason, watermarking is not applicable to a legacy classifier that is challenging
to re-train.
3.3 Design Goals
We aim to design a fingerprinting method that has the following properties.
• Fidelity. The fingerprinting method should not sacrifice the target classifier’s accuracy
at all. Watermarking methods do not have such property.
• Effectiveness. If the suspect classifier is the same as the target classifier, then the Verify
function should produce 1. Formally, we should have V erify(Extract(Ct), Cs) = 1 when
Cs = Ct.
• Robustness. If the suspect classifier is some post-processed version of the target classi-
fier (we consider popular post-processing methods that were also considered in previous
work [1, 7] and details are shown in Section 5.1.2), then the Verify function should pro-
duce 1. Formally, we should have V erify(Extract(Ct), Cs) = 1 if Cs is a post-processed
version of Ct.
• Uniqueness. The fingerprint should be unique to the target classifier. In other words,
if a suspect classifier is not the target classifier nor its post-processed version, then the
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Verify function should produce 0. Formally, we should have V erify(Extract(Ct), Cs) = 0
if Cs is neither Ct nor a post-processed version of Ct.
• Efficiency. The fingerprinting method should be efficient to extract a fingerprint for a
target classifier and verify the fingerprint for a suspect classifier.
4 Our IPGuard
4.1 Overview
A DNN classifier is essentially characterized by a classification boundary. Different classi-
fiers have different classification boundaries. Therefore, we aim to fingerprint the classification
boundary of the target classifier. In particular, we treat a set of data points (called fingerprint-
ing data points) near the target classifier’s classification boundary and their labels predicted
by the target classifier as the fingerprint. Given a suspect classifier, the model owner queries
its prediction API for the labels of the fingerprinting data points. If the predicted labels match
those in the fingerprint, then the suspect classifier is predicted to be the target classifier or a
post-processed version of the target classifier. Specifically, we overview our Extract and Verify
functions as follows:
Extract: Given a target classifier, our Extract function searches n random data points near
the classification boundary of the target classifier. We treat the n data points and their
labels predicted by the target classifier as the fingerprint. Formally, we have the fingerprint as
fCt = {(x1, y1), (x2, y2), · · · , (xn, yn)}, where xi and yi are the ith fingerprinting data point and
its label predicted by the target classifier. We formulate finding a data point near a classifier’s
classification boundary as an optimization problem and leverage gradient descent to solve the
optimization problem.
Verify: Given a suspect classifier, the model owner queries the classifier’s prediction API for
the labels of the n fingerprinting data points. In particular, we denote by y′i the label predicted
by the suspect classifier for the ith fingerprinting data point xi. Suppose m data points have
the same labels predicted by the suspect classifier and the target classifier, i.e., y′i = yi for m
data points. We define mn as the matching rate. If the matching rate is larger than or equal to
a threshold, then the Verify function produces 1, otherwise the Verify function produces 0.
Next, we describe our Extract function to search for data points near the target classifier’s
classification boundary.
4.2 Extract
Classification boundary: Suppose the target classifier is a c-class DNN classifier, where the
output layer is a softmax layer. Moreover, we denote by {g1, g2, · · · , gc} the decision functions
of the target classifier, i.e., gi(x) is the probability that the example x has a label i, where
i = 1, 2, · · · , c. For convenience, we denote by {Z1, Z2, · · · , Zc} the logits of the target classifier,
i.e., {Z1, Z2, · · · , Zc} are the outputs of the neurons in the second-to-last layer. Formally, we
have:
gi(x) =
exp(Zi(x))∑c
j=1 exp(Zj(x))
, (3)
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where i = 1, 2, · · · , c. The label y of the example x is predicted as the one that has the largest
logit or probability, i.e., y = argmaxi gi(x) = argmaxi Zi(x).
A data point is on the target classifier’s classification boundary if the target classifier
cannot decide the label of the data point. In other words, if at least two labels have the
largest probability (or logit) for a data point, then the data point is on the target classifier’s
classification boundary. Formally, we can define the target classifier’s classification boundary
as the following set of data points:
Classification boundary:
CB = {x|∃i, j, i 6= j and gi(x) = gj(x) ≥ max
t6=i,j
gt(x)}
= {x|∃i, j, i 6= j and Zi(x) = Zj(x) ≥ max
t6=i,j
Zt(x)}, (4)
where CB is the set of data points that constitute the target classifier’s classification boundary.
Finding data points near the classification boundary: We describe how to find one
data point near the target classifier’s classification boundary and our method repeatedly finds
n data points. One naive method to find a data point on the classification boundary is to
repeatedly randomly sample data points and check whether they are in the set CB. Specifically,
if a data point x satisfies the condition ∃i, j, i 6= j and gi(x) = gj(x) ≥ maxt6=i,j gt(x) or
∃i, j, i 6= j and Zi(x) = Zj(x) ≥ maxt6=i,j Zt(x), then the data point is on the classification
boundary. However, such naive sampling method would take a very long time (if possible) to
find one data point on the classification boundary. This is because the size of the set CB is a
negligible portion of the data domain.
Therefore, to address the computational challenge, we formulate finding data points near
the classification boundary as an optimization problem. Specifically, we aim to solve the
following optimization problem:
min
x
ReLU(Zi(x)− Zj(x) + k) + ReLU(max
t6=i,j
Zt(x)− Zi(x)), (5)
where i and j are randomly sampled labels, ReLU is defined as ReLU(s) = max{0, s}, and k
is related to the distance between the data point x and the classification boundary. Intuitively,
the objective function is small if Zj(x) ≥ Zi(x) + k (Zj(x) = Zi(x) means that x is on the
classification boundary) and maxt6=i,j Zt(x) ≤ Zi(x). The parameter k balances between the
robustness and uniqueness (please refer to Section 3.3 for details of robustness and uniqueness)
of our fingerprinting method. Specifically, on one hand, when k is larger, a post-processed
version of the target classifier is more likely to predict the same label for the data point, which
means that our method is more robust against post-processing. On the other hand, when k
is larger, a suspect classifier that is not a post-processed version of the target classifier is also
more likely to predict the same label for the data point, which means that our fingerprint is less
unique. We will study the impact of k on the robustness-uniqueness tradeoff in experiments.
To find a data point x near the classification boundary, we solve the optimization problem
in Equation 5 with randomly sampled i and j. Specifically, we use the Adam optimizer [19] to
solve the optimization problem and x is initialized to be a data point whose label is predicted
as i. We will discuss more details on how to initialize x and sample i and j in Section 5.1.3.
We stop the iterative process when the objective function equals 0 or we have reached the
maximum number of iterations (e.g., 1,000 in our experiments). Note that, when finding n
data points, we randomly sample different initialization, i, and j, in order to have a good
coverage of the classification boundary.
8
Table 1: Datasets, target classifiers, and suspect classifiers.
Dataset Target classifier
# Positive
suspect
classifiers
# Negative
suspect
classifiers
CIFAR-10 ResNet20 15 80
CIFAR-100 WRN-22-4 14 80
ImageNet ResNet50 10 10
5 Experiments
5.1 Experimental Setup
5.1.1 Datasets and Target Classifiers
We consider three image classification datasets that are widely used in the literature, i.e.,
CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and ImageNet. Table 1 shows the three datasets and their target
classifiers.
CIFAR-10: CIFAR-10 [20] consists of 60000 images with size 32× 32× 3. There are 50000
images in the training set and 10000 images in the testing set. CIFAR-10 is a 10-class classifi-
cation problem. We train a widely used ResNet20 [12] model as our target classifier.
CIFAR-100: Like CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 [20] has 60000 images and each image has a size of
32×32×3. However, CIFAR-100 is a 100-class classification problem. We train a wide residual
network WRN-22-4 [37] as our target classifier, which is an improved version of ResNet20 for
CIFAR-100.
ImageNet: ImageNet [27] contains about 1.2 million training examples, 50,000 validation
examples, and 100,000 testing examples from 1000 classes. We consider each image is resized
to 224× 224× 3 and we use the pre-trained ResNet50 [12] model from Keras [5] as our target
classifier.
5.1.2 Suspect Classifiers
Given a dataset and a target classifier, we consider multiple categories of suspect classifiers.
Post-processed versions of the target classifier: Like previous studies on watermark-
ing [1, 7], we consider six post-processing including 2 variants of fine-tuning, 2 variants of
retraining, and 2 variants of model compression. We expect the suspect classifiers from these
post-processing to be verified by our fingerprinting method.
• Fine-tune last layer (FTLL). Only the last layer (fully connected layer) of the target
classifier is fine-tuned using the training data. All other layers are fixed.
• Fine-tune all layer (FTAL). All layers in the target classifier are fine-tuned with the
training data.
• Retrain last layer (RTLL). The weights of the last layer are re-initialized and then
trained with the training data. All other layers are fixed.
• Retrain all layers (RTAL). The weights of the last layer are re-initialized but the
weights of all layers are retrained with the training data.
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• Weight pruning (WP). WP is a popular method to compress a neural network model [10].
In particular, we prune p fraction of weights that have the smallest absolute values and
then retrain the pruned classifier to enhance the classification accuracy. We increase p
from 0.1 with a step size 0.1 until the accuracy loss is larger than 3% (model compres-
sion aims to compress a model without substantially sacrificing the model’s accuracy);
and each p corresponds to a pruned version of the target classifier. Therefore, we may
have multiple pruned target classifiers as suspect classifiers. For instance, if we can
prune at most p = 0.5 fraction of weights from a target classifier such that the accu-
racy loss is no larger than 3%, then we have 5 suspect classifiers, which correspond to
p = 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, and 0.5, respectively. Note that FTLL, FTAL, RTLL, or RTAL has
just one post-processed version of the target classifier.
• Filter pruning (FP). FP is another popular method to compress a neural network
model [23]. In particular, we prune c fraction of filters in each layer that have the
smallest absolute values and then retrain the pruned classifier to enhance the classification
accuracy. As shown in [23], it can be too complicated to prune the last layer of each
residual block for ResNet, so we only consider other layers in each residual block. We
increase c from 116 with a step size
1
16 until the accuracy loss is larger than 3%; and each c
corresponds to a suspect classifier. We use the step size 116 because the number of filters
in our target classifiers can be divided by 16. Like WP, FP may lead to multiple suspect
classifiers for a target classifier, where each suspect classifier corresponds to a value of c.
Same-architecture neural network classifiers: It is well known that a neural network’s
loss function is non-convex. Therefore, different initializations may lead to different model
parameters, which are different local minima of the loss function. Therefore, if two owners
train their own model parameters using the same (publicly available) training data and neural
network architecture, the two models should be treated as different ones. In other words, the
fingerprint extracted for one model should not be verified for the other model.
To test our fingerprinting method in such scenarios, we train 50 neural network classifiers
that have the same architecture as the target classifier for CIFAR-10 or CIFAR-100 as suspect
classifiers. Due to our limited computation resource, we do not train the same-architecture
neural network classifiers for ImageNet.
Different-architecture neural network classifiers: For CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 datasets,
we consider LeNet-5 [22] and the popular VGG16 architecture [29] as our different-architecture
neural networks. Specifically, we train 10 models for each architecture using different initial-
izations for both CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 datasets.
For the ImageNet dataset, due to our limited computation resource, we leverage popular
pre-trained models that are available in Keras [5], instead of training our own models. For each
family of classifiers, we select the one with the highest top-1 accuracy. For example, the pre-
trained ResNet101 and ResNet152 achieve 76.42% and 76.60% top-1 accuracy, respectively,
as reported by Keras documentation. Therefore, we choose ResNet152 as the representa-
tive for the ResNet family. Overall, we consider Xception [6], VGG16 [29], ResNet152 [12],
ResNet152V2 [13], ResNeXt101 [35], InceptionV3 [31], InceptionResNetV2 [30], MobileNet
(α=1.0) [14], MobileNetV2 (α=1.4) [28], DenseNet201 [17], and NASNetLarge [39]. Note
that the input size for different models might be different. We resize the data points in our
fingerprint to fit the input size of different architectures.
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Random forest (RF): Apart from neural networks, we also consider random forest as
suspect classifiers. Specifically, for each of the three datasets, we use scikit-learn with the
default settings to train 10 random forests, each of which has 20 trees. We note that random
forests have relatively low classification accuracies. However, our goal is not to design accurate
random forest classifiers. Instead, our goal is to show that our fingerprinting method can
distinguish between neural networks and random forests. Note that we did not train random
forest classifiers for the ImageNet dataset because our memory is not large enough.
Positive vs. negative suspect classifiers: Our goal is that the post-processed versions of
the target classifier are verified, while the other suspect classifiers are not verified. For con-
venience, we call the post-processed versions of the target classifier positive suspect classifiers
and the remaining ones negative suspect classifiers. Table 1 summarizes the number of positive
and negative suspect classifiers for each dataset.
Table 2 shows the testing accuracies of the target and suspect classifiers.
5.1.3 Compared Methods
A key component of our IPGuard is to find data points near a target classifier’s classification
boundary. An adversarial example method could be used to find such data points. Therefore,
we compare with existing adversarial example methods including FGSM [8], IGSM [21], and
CW-L2 [3].
Random: This method randomly samples a data point from the data domain as a finger-
printing data point.
FGSM [8] and IGSM [21]: Both FGSM and IGSM have a parameter , which bounds
the noise in an adversarial example. We will explore different . IGSM further has a step size
parameter α. Since we use image datasets, we set α = 1255 , which is the minimal step size.
Moreover, we set the maximum number of iterations of IGSM to be 1,000.
CW-L2 [3]: CW-L2 has a parameter k, which controls the confidence of an adversarial
example. We will explore the impact of k on the performance of CW-L2. CW-L2 leverages an
Adam optimizer and we set the learning rate to be 0.001 on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100, and
0.1 on ImageNet. We use the implementation of CW-L2 published by its authors.
Our IPGuard: Our IPGuard also has a parameter k, which balances between robustness and
uniqueness. Like CW-L2, IPGuard also leverages Adam optimizer and we use the same learning
rates as CW-L2. IPGuard runs the Adam optimizer until we find a data point that makes the
value of the objective function 0 or we have reached the maximum number of iterations. We
set the maximum number of iterations to be 1,000. In our experiments, the iterative process
always stops before 1,000 iterations. In fact, IPGuard only needs several iterations in finding
most fingerprinting data points.
5.1.4 Initialization and target labels
Our fingerprint consists of n data points near the target classifier’s classification boundary with
their labels predicted by the target classifier. In our experiments, we set n = 100. We also
tried larger n, e.g., n = 10, 000. However, IPGuard and existing efficient adversarial example
methods such as FGSM and IGSM have negligible performance improvement (measured by
ARUC that we will introduce in the next part). To find one such data point x, we need to
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Table 2: Testing accuracies of the target and suspect classifiers. “–” means not applicable.
If there are multiple classifiers from the same type, we show the range of accuracies. For
instance, for the same-architecture neural network classifier, we trained 50 ResNet20 models
for the CIFAR-10 dataset, and their accuracies are in the range [0.91,0.92]. For positive suspect
classifiers based on WP (or FP), we show the accuracies of the suspect classifiers with p fraction
of weights (or c fraction of filters) pruned for all p (or c) that sacrifice the target classifier’s
accuracy by at most 3%.
Classifier type CIFAR-10 CIFAR-100 ImageNet
Target classifier
ResNet20 0.91 – –
WRN-22-4 – 0.75 –
ResNet50 – – 0.75
Positive
suspect
classifiers
FTLL 0.92 0.75 0.75
FTAL 0.92 0.75 0.76
RTLL 0.92 0.75 0.72
RTAL 0.92 0.75 0.72
WP
p=0.1 0.91 0.74 0.75
p=0.2 0.91 0.75 0.75
p=0.3 0.90 0.74 0.75
p=0.4 0.90 0.74 0.73
p=0.5 – 0.73 0.72
FP
c=1/16 0.91 0.75 0.73
c=2/16 0.91 0.74 0.73
c=3/16 0.91 0.74 0.72
c=4/16 0.90 0.73 –
c=5/16 0.89 0.73 –
c=6/16 0.89 – –
c=7/16 0.88 – –
Negative
suspect
classifiers
Same
architecture
ResNet20 [0.91,0.92] – –
DNNs WRN-22-4 – [0.74,0.76] –
Different
architecture
DNNs
LeNet-5 [0.64,0.67] [0.31,0.34] –
VGG16 [0.93,0.94] [0.68,0.70] 0.71
ResNet152 – – 0.77
ResNet152V2 – – 0.78
InceptionV3 – – 0.78
InceptionResNetV2 – – 0.80
Xception – – 0.79
MobileNet(α=1.0) – – 0.70
MobileNetV2(α=1.4) – – 0.75
DenseNet201 – – 0.77
NASNetLarge – – 0.83
Random
forests
RF [0.40,0.41] [0.15,0.16] –
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Table 3: Suffix that represents a combination of initializing a data point and selecting target
label. The rows represent two ways of initializations, and the columns represent two ways of
selecting the target label.
Random label Least-likely label
Training example -TR -TL
Random example -RR -RL
initialize a data point and pick a target label, and then we use a compared method to find x.
We consider two ways of initialization and two ways of selecting the target label.
Initialization: We consider the following two ways to initialize a data point.
• Training example (T). In this method, we randomly sample a training example as the
initialized data point.
• Random (R). In this method, we randomly sample a data point from the entire data
domain as the initialized data point. Since we are using image datasets, we uniformly
sample from [0, 1]d, where d is the dimension of the images.
Target label selection: We consider the following two ways to select a target label.
• Random (R). In this method, we randomly select a label as the target label for a data
point.
• Least-likely label (L). In this method, we select the least-likely label of an initialized
data point as the target label. The least-likely label of a data point is the label that has
the smallest logit predicted by the target classifier. In other words, the target classifier
is least confident at predicting the least-likely label as the label for the initialized data
point. We speculate that the target classifier’s classification boundary near such target
label and initialized data point is more unique.
We will compare the two initialization methods and the two methods of selecting target
label. For convenience, we use a suffix “-TR”, “-TL”, “-RR”, or “-RL” to represent a com-
bination of initialization and target label selection. Table 3 summarizes the suffixes. For
instance, FGSM-TL means that we initialize a data point as a training example, select the
least-likely label as the target label, and use FGSM to find a targeted adversarial example as
a fingerprinting data point.
5.1.5 Evaluation Metrics
As we described in Section 3.3, we desire 5 properties for a fingerprinting method. All compared
methods have no accuracy loss of the target classifier. Moreover, all compared methods achieve
the effectiveness property. Therefore, we compare IPGuard and existing adversarial example
methods with respect to robustness, uniqueness, and efficiency properties.
Matching rate: For a suspect classifier, we query the classifier’s API for the labels of the
fingerprinting data points. Matching rate is the fraction of fingerprinting data points whose
labels predicted by the suspect classifier match those predicted by the target classifier. A
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Figure 2: Illustration of robustness-uniqueness curves and our metric ARUC to jointly measure
robustness and uniqueness. Left: A perfect ARUC (i.e., AURC=1), where both robustness
and uniqueness are 1 for any matching rate threshold. Middle: A mediocre ARUC, where
both robustness and uniqueness are large only when the matching rate threshold is around 0.5.
Right: A bad ARUC, where no matching rate threshold makes both robustness and uniqueness
large.
positive suspect classifier (i.e., a post-processed version of the target classifier) should have a
large matching rate, while a negative suspect classifier should have a low matching rate.
ARUC: Given a matching rate threshold, the Verify function produces 1 if a suspect classifier
has a matching rate that is greater than or equal to the threshold. We use the fraction of
positive suspect classifiers that are verified to measure the robustness of a method, and we use
the fraction of negative suspect classifiers that are not verified to measure the uniqueness of a
method.
The matching rate threshold controls the robustness-uniqueness tradeoffs. In particular,
robustness decreases and uniqueness increases as the matching rate threshold increases. One
way to avoid the impact of the selection of matching rate threshold and consistently compare
different methods is to use AUC [2], a standard machine learning evaluation metric, to jointly
measure the robustness and uniqueness of a method. Specifically, we can rank the positive
and negative suspect classifiers in a decreasing order according to their matching rates. Then,
AUC is essentially the probability that a randomly sampled positive suspect classifier ranks
higher than a randomly sampled negative suspect classifier. However, AUC is insufficient
to jointly measure robustness and uniqueness in our problem. Specifically, AUC does not
characterize the gaps between the matching rates of positive suspect classifiers and those of
the negative suspect classifiers. For instance, once all positive suspect classifiers have larger
matching rates than all negative suspect classifiers, AUC is 1 no matter how large the gap
between the matching rates is. However, such gap is important in our problem. Specifically,
the positive and negative suspect classifiers we evaluate may be a subset of suspect classifiers in
practice. A larger gap between the matching rates of our evaluated positive suspect classifiers
and those of our evaluated negative suspect classifiers means that it is more likely to select a
matching rate threshold to achieve both large robustness and uniqueness in practice.
Therefore, we propose the Area under the Robustness-Uniqueness Curves (ARUC) as a
metric to jointly evaluate the robustness and uniqueness of a method. Specifically, we draw
the robustness and uniqueness curves in the same graph as we increase the matching rate
threshold from 0 to 1. The two curves intersect at a certain point. We define ARUC as the
area under the intersected Robustness-Uniqueness curves. Figure 2 illustrates ARUC in three
scenarios. ARUC ranges from 0 to 1. A larger ARUC indicates that it is more likely to have
large robustness and uniqueness at the same time, i.e., for a wider range of matching rate
threshold, both robustness and uniqueness are large.
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Figure 3: Impact of  on ARUC for FGSM.
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Figure 4: Impact of  on ARUC for IGSM.
Formally, ARUC is defined as follows:
ARUC =
∫ 1
0
min{R(τ), U(τ)}dτ, (6)
where τ is a matching rate threshold, and R(τ) and U(τ) are the robustness and uniqueness
when the matching rate threshold is τ , respectively. We evenly divide the range [0,1] to r
intervals and use the rightmost point in each interval to represent the interval. Then, we can
approximate ARUC as follows:
ARUC =
1
r
r∑
τ ′=1
min{R(τ
′
r
), U(
τ ′
r
)}. (7)
In our experiments, we set r = 100.
Efficiency: In practice, deep neural network classifiers often have large scales. Therefore, the
fingerprinting method should be scalable. We use the running time of finding the fingerprinting
data points to measure the efficiency of a method.
5.2 Results
ARUC: Figure 3 and Figure 4 respectively show the impact of  on the ARUC for FGSM and
IGSM, where the four combinations of initialization and target label selection are considered
(please refer to Table 3 for the definition of the suffixes). For FGSM, ARUC first increases and
then decreases or fluctuates as  increases. For IGSM, ARUC first increases and then keeps
stable as  increases. ARUC keeps stable for large  because IGSM moves a step α in each
iteration no matter how large  is and stops as soon as it finds an adversarial example. We
observe that no matter how we select , FGSM and IGSM have ARUCs that are less than 0.7.
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Figure 5: Impact of k on ARUC for CW-L2.
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Figure 6: Impact of k on ARUC for IPGuard.
Table 4: ARUCs of the compared methods.
CIFAR-10 CIFAR-100 ImageNet
Random 0.35 0.52 0.22
FGSM 0.63 0.58 0.53
IGSM 0.59 0.65 0.43
CW-L2 0.95 1.00 0.99
IPGuard 0.94 1.00 0.98
Figure 5 and Figure 6 respectively show the impact of k on ARUC for CW-L2 and IPGuard.
For both methods, ARUC first increases and then decreases as k increases (except that IPGuard
has not started to decrease before k = 200 on ImageNet). This is because, as k increases, the
fingerprinting data points are further away from the target classifier’s classification boundary.
Therefore, the matching rates of both positive and negative suspect classifiers increase, which
means that robustness increases and uniqueness decreases. Moreover, matching rates of positive
suspect classifiers increase faster than those of negative suspect classifiers when k is small, but
slower than those of negative suspect classifiers when k is large. As a result, ARUC first
increases and then decreases. For both CW-L2 and IPGuard, the combination “-TL” can
achieve the best ARUCs. Moreover, for IPGuard, least-likely label outperforms random label
when k is large no matter how we initialize the fingerprinting data points, i.e., IPGuard-TL
outperforms IPGuard-TR and IPGuard-RL outperforms IPGuard-RR, except that IPGuard-
TL and IPGuard-TR achieve comparable ARUCs on ImageNet when k is large. We speculate
the reason is that the classification boundary near the initialized data points and their least-
likely labels is more unique.
Table 4 shows the best ARUC that each compared method can achieve via proper parameter
setting for each dataset. As we can see, CW-L2 and IPGuard achieve comparable ARUCs;
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Table 5: Matching rates of the compared methods for positive and negative suspect classifiers
on CIFAR-10.
Suspect classifier FGSM IGSM CW-L2 IPGuard
Positive
suspect
classifiers
FTLL 0.90 0.99 1.00 1.00
FTAL 0.92 0.90 1.00 1.00
RTLL 0.87 0.99 1.00 1.00
RTAL 0.90 0.66 1.00 1.00
WP
p=0.1 0.86 0.91 1.00 1.00
p=0.2 0.86 0.91 1.00 1.00
p=0.3 0.89 0.84 1.00 1.00
p=0.4 0.90 0.70 1.00 1.00
FP
c=1/16 0.78 0.67 1.00 1.00
c=2/16 0.80 0.41 1.00 1.00
c=3/16 0.87 0.37 1.00 1.00
c=4/16 0.82 0.18 0.99 0.99
c=5/16 0.79 0.17 0.97 0.94
c=6/16 0.74 0.14 0.89 0.85
c=7/16 0.77 0.09 0.70 0.71
Negative
suspect
classifiers
Same
architecture
DNNs
ResNet20 [0.06,0.66] [0.00,0.01] [0.00,0.07] [0.00,0.09]
Different
architecture
LeNet-5 [0.08,0.49] [0.00,0.03] [0.00,0.03] [0.00,0.03]
DNNs VGG16 [0.08,0.78] [0.00,0.01] [0.00,0.00] [0.00,0.01]
Random
forests
RF [0.02,0.09] [0.00,0.01] [0.00,0.00] [0.00,0.00]
and they substantially outperform other methods.
Matching rate: Table 5, Table 6, and Table 7 respectively show the matching rates of the
compared methods for the three datasets, where the parameter of each method is set such that
it achieves the best ARUC on a dataset. For each category of negative suspect classifiers, we
have multiple instances. Therefore, we show the range of matching rates for them. We have
several observations.
First, positive suspect classifiers have larger matching rates than negative suspect classifiers
in most cases. In particular, for IGSM, CW-L2, and IPGuard, there exists proper matching
rate thresholds that make both robustness and uniqueness equal to 1. These results may
indicate that the classification boundary of a target classifier is closer to those of the post-
processed versions of the target classifier than those of other classifiers. However, CW-L2
and IPGuard achieve the largest gaps between matching rates of positive suspect classifiers
and those of negative suspect classifiers. In other words, for a wider range of matching rate
threshold, CW-L2 and IPGuard can achieve both robustness and uniqueness of 1. For instance,
on CIFAR10, IGSM, CW-L2, and IPGuard respectively achieve gaps of 0.06, 0.03, 0.63, and
0.62 between the smallest matching rate of positive suspect classifiers and the largest matching
rate of negative suspect classifiers. Our evaluated suspect classifiers are a subset of suspect
classifiers in practice. A larger such gap makes it more likely to select a matching rate threshold
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Table 6: Matching rates of the compared methods for positive and negative suspect classifiers
on CIFAR-100.
Suspect classifier FGSM IGSM CW-L2 IPGuard
Positive
suspect
classifiers
FTLL 0.99 0.98 1.00 1.00
FTAL 0.86 0.92 1.00 1.00
RTLL 0.92 0.81 1.00 1.00
RTAL 0.76 0.49 1.00 1.00
WP
p=0.1 0.76 0.84 1.00 1.00
p=0.2 0.72 0.84 1.00 1.00
p=0.3 0.70 0.83 1.00 1.00
p=0.4 0.54 0.78 1.00 1.00
p=0.5 0.56 0.66 1.00 1.00
FP
c=1/16 0.78 0.70 1.00 1.00
c=2/16 0.66 0.53 1.00 1.00
c=3/16 0.59 0.42 1.00 1.00
c=4/16 0.48 0.28 1.00 1.00
c=5/16 0.55 0.20 0.99 0.99
Negative
suspect
classifiers
Same
architecture
DNNs
WRN-22-4 [0.02,0.36] [0.00,0.04] [0.00,0.01] [0.00,0.02]
Different
architecture
LeNet-5 [0.00,0.07] [0.00,0.01] [0.00,0.00] [0.00,0.01]
DNNs VGG16 [0.00,0.11] [0.00,0.01] [0.00,0.00] [0.00,0.01]
Random
forests
RF [0.00,0.04] [0.00,0.02] [0.00,0.00] [0.00,0.00]
that achieves both large robustness and uniqueness in practice.
Second, two neural network classifiers, which use the same architecture but different initial-
izations when learning the model parameters, have substantially different classification bound-
aries, even if their testing accuracies are close. For instance, on CIFAR-100, the target classifier
is a WRN-22-4 model; and the other WRN-22-4 models that are trained with different ini-
tializations have matching rates that are close to 0 for the compared methods except FGSM.
Third, among the post-processing techniques, FP tends to have lower matching rates, which
indicates that FP changes the target classifier’s classification boundary more substantially.
Efficiency: Table 8 shows the running time of generating the 100 fingerprinting data points
for different methods, where the parameter of each method is set to achieve the best ARUC on
a dataset. IPGuard is slower than FGSM and IGSM. However, IPGuard is orders of magnitude
faster than CW-L2. IPGuard and CW-L2 achieve comparable ARUCs, but IPGuard is more
efficient than CW-L2. This is because they both can find data points near a target classifier’s
classification boundary, but IPGuard does not constrain noise added to the data points to be
more efficient. For instance, on the CIFAR-100 dataset, the average L2-norms of the noise
added by CW-L2 and IPGuard to the initial data points are 0.64 and 1.29, respectively.
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Table 7: Matching rates of the compared methods for positive and negative suspect classifiers
on ImageNet.
Suspect classifier FGSM IGSM CW-L2 IPGuard
Positive
suspect
classifiers
FTLL 1.00 0.95 1.00 1.00
FTAL 0.13 0.39 1.00 1.00
RTLL 0.75 0.32 1.00 1.00
RTAL 0.43 0.10 0.99 0.99
WP
p=0.1 0.96 0.83 1.00 1.00
p=0.2 0.65 0.81 1.00 1.00
p=0.3 0.58 0.77 1.00 1.00
FP
c=1/16 0.82 0.02 1.00 0.99
c=2/16 0.01 0.02 1.00 0.96
c=3/16 0.00 0.01 0.99 0.90
Negative
suspect
classifiers
Different
architecture
DNNs
VGG16 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.01
ResNet152 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
ResNet152V2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
InceptionV3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
InceptionResNetV2 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
Xception 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
MobileNet(α=1.0) 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
MobileNetV2(α=1.4) 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
DenseNet201 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00
NASNetLarge 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 8: Running time (in seconds) of generating the 100 fingerprinting data points for the
compared methods.
CIFAR-10 CIFAR-100 ImageNet
Random <1 <1 <1
FGSM 4.9 4.6 11.6
IGSM 11.2 15.6 47.9
CW-L2 20,006.3 30,644.6 121,955.7
IPGuard 37.8 249.9 7,634.3
6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this work, we propose to leverage data points near a classifier’s classification boundary to
fingerprint the classifier and track its use in the wild. Moreover, we propose a new method
to efficiently find such data points. Our empirical results on three large-scale benchmark
datasets show that 1) the fingerprint extracted by our method can be robust against popular
post-processing of the classifier and unique to the classifier (and its post-processed versions)
simultaneously; and 2) our method is more efficient than state-of-the-art adversarial example
methods at finding data points near the classification boundary because our method does not
constrain the noise added to such data points.
We envision that there is an arms race between a model owner and an attacker. An attacker
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could strategically post-process the target classifier to evade the model owner’s fingerprinting
method, while a model owner aims to fingerprint a target classifier such that any post-processed
version of its target classifier can be identified. We note that, once stealing and post-processing
a target classifier requires less resource (e.g., computation resource, training data) than training
a classifier from scratch, an attacker may be motivated to steal and/or post-process the target
classifier instead of training a classifier from scratch. Therefore, the arms race between a
model owner and an attacker may last until stealing the target classifier and evading the
model owner’s fingerprinting method requires more resource than training a classifier from
scratch. It is an interesting future work to rigorously explore such arms race between model
owners and attackers.
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